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ABSTRACT
A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO FAULT ANALYSIS AND
MITIGATION IN NANOSCALE FABRICS
September 2012
MD MUWYID UZZAMAN KHAN
B.Sc., ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
M.S.E.C.E., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Csaba Andras Moritz

High defect rates are associated with novel nanodevice-based systems owing to
unconventional and self-assembly based manufacturing processes. Furthermore, in
emerging nanosystems, fault mechanisms and distributions may be very different from
CMOS due to unique physical layer aspects, and emerging circuit and logic styles. Thus,
theoretical fault models for nanosystems are necessary to extract detailed characteristics
of fault generation and propagation. Using the intuition garnered from the theoretical
analysis, modular and structural redundancy schemes can be specifically tailored to the
intricacies of the fabric in order to achieve higher reliability of output signals.
In this thesis, we develop a detailed analytical fault model for the Nanoscale
Application Specific Integrated Circuits (NASIC) fabric that can determine probabilities
of output faults taking into account the defect scenarios, the logic and circuit style of the
fabric as well as structural redundancy schemes that may be incorporated in the circuits.
Evaluation of fault rates using the analytical model for single NASIC tiles show an
inequality of the probability of output faulty ‘1’s and ‘0’s. To mitigate the effects of the
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unequal fault rates, biased voting schemes are introduced and are shown to achieve up to
27% improvement in the reliability of output signals compared to conventional majority
voting schemes.
NASIC circuits have to be cascaded in order to build larger systems. Furthermore,
modular redundancy alone will be insufficient to tolerate high defect rates since multiple
input modules may be faulty. Hence incorporation of structural redundancy is crucial.
Thus in this thesis, we study the propagation of faults through a cascade of NASIC
circuits employing the conventional structural redundancy scheme which is referred to
here as the Regular Structural Redundancy. In our analysis we find that although circuits
with Regular Structural Redundancy achieve greater signal reliability compared to nonredundant circuits, the signal reliability rapidly drops along the cascade due to an
escalation of faulty ‘0’s. This effect is attributed to the poor tolerance of input faulty ‘0’s
exhibited by circuits with the Regular Structural Redundancy. Having identified this, we
design a new scheme called the Staggered Structural Redundancy prioritizing the
tolerance of input faulty ‘0’s. A cascade of circuits employing the Staggered Structural
Redundancy is shown to maintain signal reliability greater than 0.98 for over 100 levels
of cascade at 5% defect rate whereas the signal reliability for a cascade of circuits with
the Regular Structural Redundancy dropped to 0.5 after 7 levels of cascade.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
A variety of nano-materials and nano-devices including semiconductor nanowires
[1],[2], carbon nanotubes [3], quantum cellular automata (QCA) [4], graphene-based
devices [5], spin-wave fabrics [6] and molecular devices [7] have been proposed as
alternatives to conventional CMOS. However, self-assembly and unconventional
manufacturing approaches for scalable assembly of nanostructures may imply orders of
magnitude higher defect rates compared to CMOS [8]. Furthermore, nanoscale
computational fabrics may have very different fault models due to novel circuit and logic
styles and different defect scenarios. It is thus necessary to first study the fault
characteristics in nanoscale fabrics using detailed theoretical models. The intuition
garnered from this analysis will facilitate the design of fault-tolerance schemes that are
better tailored to these unique fault characteristics thus achieving improved yield.
In this thesis, we derive detailed analytical expressions for the probability of ‘0’ to
‘1’ faults (referred to as faulty ‘1’s) and ‘1’ to ‘0’ faults (faulty ‘0’s) at the output of
circuits implemented in the Nanoscale Application Specific ICs (NASICs) fabric [9] [10].
The expressions are in terms of the probability of defects, input faults and the specific
logic and circuit styles of the fabric. The detailed analytical fault models are also capable
of accounting for structural redundancies that may be implemented within the circuits.
Results obtained from analyzing single NASIC tiles using the model indicate that the
probabilities of the two types of faults are unequal. Since one fault is more likely to
occur, biased voting schemes instead of conventional majority voting schemes provide
higher signal reliabilities by offering greater protection against the most likely faults. Our
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theoretical analysis shows that the biased voting schemes provide up to 27%
improvement in signal reliability compared to the conventional majority voting schemes.
To build larger systems NASIC circuits will have to be cascaded. Hence,
evaluation of the fault characteristics and improvement of the signal reliability through
cascaded NASIC tiles is necessary. Furthermore, modular redundancy alone will not be
sufficient to tolerate the high defect rates characteristic of nanoscale fabrics since
multiple input modules may be faulty. Thus, structural redundancy needs to be
incorporated within individual circuits. Thus in this thesis, we study the propagation of
faulty ‘1’s and faulty ‘0’s through cascades of structurally redundant NASIC circuits and
their effect on the overall Signal Reliability. In our analysis, we demonstrate that the
Signal Reliability through cascades of circuits employing the conventional structural
redundancy scheme (referred to as Regular Structural Redundancy (RSR)) rapidly drops
along the cascade due to an escalation of the probability of faulty ‘0’s. Having identified
that Regular Structural Redundancy schemes are intolerant of input faulty ‘0’s, we
propose and introduce a novel structural redundancy scheme called the Staggered
Structural Redundancy (SSR) that offers improved resilience against input faulty ‘0’s.
The novel Staggered Structural Redundancy schemes are shown to have 56% improved
tolerance of input faulty ‘0’s compared to the Regular Structural Redundancy. Our results
show that although the signal reliability through cascades of RSR circuits drops to 0.5
after 7 levels of cascades at 10% defect rate, the signal reliability through cascades of
SSR circuits remain above 0.98 for over 100 levels of cascade due to its adequate
capability of tolerating both input faulty ‘1’s and ‘0’s.

2

The rest of the thesis is organized as follow. Chapter 2 discusses related prior
work in the fault tolerance in nanofabrics and provides overview of NASICs and its
structural redundancy schemes. Chapter 3 provides the derivation of the detailed
analytical fault models for the NASIC fabric, both for circuits with and without structural
redundancy. Chapter 4 utilizes the analytical models to demonstrate the benefits of biased
voting schemes in improving signal reliability. Chapter 5 provides a study of the fault
propagation through cascades of circuits with conventional structural redundancy and
introduces a novel structural redundancy which is shown to achieve improved signal
reliability. Finally, chapter 6 summarizes this thesis.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED BACKGROUND

2.1 Overview of NASICs
Nanoscale Application Specific Integrated Circuits (NASICs) [11]-[16] is a
computational fabric based on a 2-dimensional grid of semiconductor nanowires with
external dynamic control for data streaming and cascading.
Cross-nanowire transistors (xnwFETs) are formed at selected cross-points to
implement the logic function. Microwires are used to provide VDD, GND and control
signals for data streaming. In NASICs, the 2-stage dynamic NAND-NAND logic style is
one of the logic families used [14]. The output signals from the first stage NAND gates
become the input signals for the nanowire transistors in the second stage NAND gate.
Dynamic circuits and pipelining in NASICs obviate the need for explicit latching and
improves the density. Furthermore, the NAND-NAND logic style requires only n-type
xnwFETs leading to a simplified manufacturing pathway.
The elemental unit in NASICs is called a Tile. It is a single NASIC circuit
implementing a 2-stage logic function. Figure 1 shows a single NASIC tile (consisting of
2 dynamic NAND stages) implementing a 1-bit full adder. In Figure 1, hpre and heva are
the precharge and evaluate control transistors that enable dynamic circuit evaluation.
Many such tiles can be cascaded together to build a large-scale system such as a
processor [17] or an image processing architecture [18].
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Figure 1. A full adder implemented in NASICs

In NASICs, high fan-in circuits are possible since delay scales linearly with
respect to fan-in as opposed to conventional CMOS where the trend is typically quadratic
[19]. This is due to the unique dynamic control schemes used, where successive cascaded
stages are evaluated using different control signals. The series stack resistance of a given
stage is overcome during and after the pre-charge of the previous stage. This implies that
during the evaluation of the current stage, only the linear impact of capacitance affects
the performance with increasing fan-in. This behavior has been verified through detailed
simulations of device behavior and circuit characteristics. Additional details can be found
in [19].
2.2 Fault Tolerance in Nanofabrics
Self-assembly and unconventional manufacturing approaches for scalable
assembly of nanostructures may imply orders of magnitude higher defect rates compared
to CMOS [8]. Therefore, built-in fault tolerance techniques need to be incorporated in
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nanoscale systems at various levels to achieve high-yield systems. Prior work on fault
tolerance of hard defects includes techniques such as reconfiguration and built-in
redundancy. Techniques for reconfigurable fabrics include mapping of logic functions
onto defective circuits or reconfiguring around defective blocks [20] -[23] and built-in
self test techniques for testing and diagnosis [24][25]. In hardware redundancy techniques
for non-reconfigurable crossbar architectures, a lot of the previous work concentrated on
the efficient mapping of logic functions onto defective crossbars [26]-[28]. Both these
approaches lead to technical challenges such as the need for special reconfigurable
devices or the complex interfacing between micro and nano circuits to extract defect
maps.
Modular redundancy techniques have been widely researched in the past few
decades and include Triple modular redundancy (TMR) [29]-[32] and N-tuple modular
redundancy [33]. Designs of new voter circuits [34] [35] and even NMR systems without
a centralized voter [36] have been proposed. A more fine-grained built-in fault tolerance
technique is the structural redundancy [37]. As the focus shifts to nanoscale devices,
hardware redundancy techniques still hold promise [38]-[40].
2.3 Structural Redundancy in NASICs
In NASICs, possible defects include broken nanowires, stuck-on and stuck-off
type defects. Reliable manufacturing of nanowires up to a few microns in length has been
demonstrated in [2], so the frequency of broken nanowires is expected to be very low.
Stuck-on transistors are the most prevalent in the proposed manufacturing pathway [41]
due to the ion implantation and metallization processes involved.
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Figure 2. NASIC fault tolerance schemes: (a) NASIC tile with no redundancy incorporated.
(b) 2-way redundant implementation of the NASIC tile in (a).

Structural redundancy is employed in NASICs by creating redundant copies of
nanowires. Redundant signals are created and logically merged in the logic planes with
regular signals. Every xnwFET has a redundant copy so that even if one of the copies is
stuck-on, then the redundant copy or copies will be able to switch off, thus ensuring
proper logic implementation.
Figure 2 (a) shows a single non-redundant NASIC tile and Figure 2 (b) shows its
2-way redundant implementation. In the 2-way redundant tile, every nanowire is
duplicated, each containing twice as many xnwFETs. The redundant signals are merged
within the logic plane itself. In Figure 2 (a) and (b),
redundant signal of

, respectively.
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and

is the complement and the

CHAPTER 3
ANALYTICAL FAULT MODEL FOR NASICs

3.1 Introduction
Analytical fault models for NASICs are necessary to extract detailed
characteristics of error generation and propagation. This will facilitate the exploration of
improved fault tolerance schemes that are specifically tailored to the intricacies of the
fabric. In this chapter, we first derive an analytical fault model for a NASIC tile without
any structural redundancy and then extend it to include tiles with Regular Structural
Redundancy. The analytical model is capable of calculating output fault rates and signal
reliabilities in the presence of stuck-on defects and input faults.
3.2 Defect Model
Defects in the NASICs fabric depend on the manufacturing pathway used. One
possible manufacturing pathway has been described in [41]. Reliable manufacturing of
nanowires up to a few microns in length has been demonstrated in [2], so the frequency
of broken nanowires is assumed to be negligible. Stuck-on transistors are the most
prevalent in this pathway due to the ion implantation and metallization processes
involved. Thus in the derivation of the model only stuck-on type defects are considered.
The probability of a transistor being stuck-on, denoted by

, thus represents the

defect rate of the NASIC fabric in this chapter. These defects are considered to occur
independently of each other, since they are caused by local effects (e.g. lateral diffusion
after ion implant).
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A defect rate of up to 15% is considered because, according to our initial work
[13], at defect rates higher than this, any density advantage over projected CMOS would
likely be eliminated in the context of microprocessor designs. It must be noted that this is
a device-level defect rate and is 10 orders of magnitude higher than in scaled CMOS. For
instance, CMOS defect rates are 0.4 defects/cm2 [42] whereas 1%-15% defect rate in
NASICs translates to billions of defects/cm2.
3.3 Assumptions
In the derivation of the model, stuck-on defects in the NASIC tile are assumed to
occur independently since they are caused by local effects such as lateral diffusion after
ion implantation. The following assumptions are also made for tractability of the model:
 Logic functions on the NASIC tiles are assumed to be implemented in the
canonical sum of products form without minimization.
 All the inputs of a tile are assumed to have the same probability of being faulty
and they are assumed to occur independently.
 Occurrences of faults on horizontal nanowires are assumed to be independent of
one another.
3.4 Notations
Figure 3 shows two NAND stages in a single n-input NASIC tile. Here, input
signals are denoted by .
stage and

to

to

are the minterms generated by the first NAND

denote the transistors in the 2nd stage NAND gate.

The rest of the notations that have been used in the derivation of the model are
given in Table 1.
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Table 1. Notations

Symbol

Description

n

Number of inputs for the logic function implemented

m

Number of minterms generated by the first NAND
stage

SC

Correct output of logic function

SA

Actual fault-prone output from a defective NASIC tile

Mi C

Correct ith minterm expected from a defect-free
circuit, 0 ≤ i ≤ m-1

Mi A

Actual fault-prone ith minterm in a defective circuit

(

)

Correct (actual) state of Transistor in the first NAND
stage

(

)

Correct (actual) state of Transistor gated by minterm
Mi in the second stage NAND gate
Probability of a faulty ‘0’ at the output of a defective
tile

=
Prob{SA=0|SC=1}
=
A

C

Prob{S =1|S =0}

Probability of a faulty ‘1’ at the output of a defective
tile

=
Prob{MiA=0|MiC=1}

Probability of the minterm, Mi, being a faulty ‘0’

=
Prob{MiA=1|MiC=0}

Probability of the minterm, Mi, being a faulty ‘1’

Probability that an input is faulty ‘0’
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Probability that an input is faulty ‘1’
; Probability that
transistor in first NAND stage, T1, is switched-on due
to fault whereas ideally it should have been switchedoff
; Probability that
transistor in second NAND stage, T2, is switched-on
due to fault whereas ideally it should have been
switched-off
Probability that a transistor is Stuck-ON

Figure 3. An n-input NASIC tile built with 2 NAND stages.

3.5 Tiles without Structural Redundancy

3.5.1 Occurrence of Faulty ‘1’

11

In this section we derive the equation for the probability of occurrence of a
faulty ‘1’ (0-to-1 fault) at the output of a structurally non-redundant NASIC tile, given
the probability of stuck-on defects, stuck-off defects and input faults.
In a 2-stage dynamic NAND-NAND logic implementation, a ‘0’ is produced at
the output if all of the input signals (minterms) to the second stage NAND gate are ‘1’s.
Thus, in a NASIC tile, all of the xnwFETs (transistors) in the second stage dynamic
NAND gate must be correctly switched on to allow the output to evaluate to ‘0’. Hence,
for a faulty ‘1’ to be produced at the output, any one of the transistors has to be switchedoff to prevent evaluation to ‘0’. This will happen if any of the transistors in the 2nd stage
NAND gate is incorrectly switched-off. Mathematically,
(3.1)
(3.2)

1

A transistor,

will be correctly switched-on in the event that the transistor is

functional and the minterm gating it carries a correct ‘0’, or in the event that the transistor
is simply stuck-on. Thus,

(3.3)

=

(3.4)
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Substituting Equation 3.4 into Equation 3.2 and simplifying, we get an expression
for the probability of occurrence of a faulty ‘1’ at the output of a NASIC tile,

(3.5)

The above probability of a faulty ‘1’ has been expressed in terms of the
probability of a transistor being stuck-on,

, the number of minterm signals, m, and

the probability of a minterm producing an incorrect ‘0’,

.

In this model, the probability of a minterm being a faulty ‘0’,

, is entirely

dependent on the transistors of the first stage NAND gates being defective. The
transistors in the first NAND stage are gated by tile inputs. For an n-input NASIC tile,
there are

possible input combinations. Since each of the horizontal nanowires in the

first stage is a dynamic NAND gate, only for one particular input pattern should the
output of the horizontal nanowire be ‘0’. The output should be a ‘1’ for all of the rest of
the input patterns. For each of these input patterns that should produce an output ‘1’, one
or more transistors will be correctly switched off to keep the output of the minterm at ‘1’.
Thus, for a minterm to be a faulty ‘0’, one or more transistors need to be incorrectly
switched-on (depending on the input pattern), and the rest of the transistors need to
remain correctly switched-on. For instance, in a 2 input logic function implemented in the
NASIC fabric, at any one of the first stage NAND gates, there are 3 input patterns
(

) that should produce an output of ‘1’ at that NAND gate. 1 out of those 3

input patterns will require both transistors in the gate to be incorrectly switched-on to
produce a faulty ‘0’. 2 of the input patterns will require 1 transistor to be incorrectly
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switched-on and the other transistor to be remain correctly switched-on. Assuming all
input patterns are equally probable,

for this specific case of 2-input logic function

would be,
(3.6)

Extending this for an n-input NASIC tile and using the binomial theorem for
simplification, the probability of minterm faulty ‘0’ in an n-input tile is,
(3.7)

The above probability is written in terms of the probability of transistors in the
first NAND stage being correctly and incorrectly switched-on. A transistor in the first
stage may be incorrectly switched-on if it is either stuck-on or if the tile input gating the
transistor is carrying a faulty ‘1’. Thus, the probability of T1 being incorrectly switchedon can be written as,
(3.8)

Similarly, the probability of a transistor in the 1st NAND stage being correctly
switched-on is the probability of the event that the transistor is stuck-on or the transistor
is functional with the input gating the transistor carrying a correct logic ‘1’. Thus,
(3.9)

Finally, by substituting Equation 3.8 and 3.9 into Equation 3.7 and subsequently
substituting Equation 3.7 into Equation 3.5, the expression for the probability of an
14

output faulty ‘1’ is expressed in terms of the probability of stuck-on defects, the
probability of input faults, the fan-in and the number of minterms of the specific NASIC
tile.
3.5.2 Occurrence of Faulty ‘0’
In this section we derive the equation for the probability of occurrence of a faulty
‘0’ (1-to-0 fault) at the output of a NASIC tile. A faulty ‘0’ is said to occur when the
inputs to a tile are such that in an ideal case, the output of the tile should be a ‘1’ but due
to defects within the tile and input faults from the preceding tile, the output is a ‘0’.
When an input pattern that should produce a ‘1’ at the output of a defect-free
circuit arrives at such a 2-stage NAND-NAND circuit, all of the minterms (inputs to the
second NAND stage) carry logic ‘1’ except for one minterm, Mx, that carries a logic ‘0’.
Thus, only one transistor, say Tx, at the second stage NAND gate is correctly switchedoff in a defect-free circuit to keep the output at logic ‘1’. Hence, for a faulty ‘0’ to occur
in a defective circuit, transistor Tx should be incorrectly switched-on while the other
transistors remain switched-on, enabling evaluation to faulty ‘0’.
(3.10)
(3.11)

(3.12)
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Transistor

will incorrectly switch-on in the event that the transistor is

functional but the minterm gating the transistor is incorrectly ‘1’or in the event that the
transistor is stuck-on.
(3.13)

The minterm will be a faulty ‘1’ if at least one of the 1st stage transistors is
incorrectly switched-off. Thus,
(3.14)

The above probability of minterm faulty ‘0’ can be calculated by using Equation
3.9. By substituting Equation 3.4 and 3.13 into Equation 3.12, the probability of
occurrence of a faulty ‘0’ can be written as,
(3.15)

By substituting Equation 3.7 and 3.14 into Equation 3.15, probability of faulty ‘0’
at the output of a NASIC tile with no structural redundancy can be obtained
3.6 Tiles with Regular Structural Redundancy
In this section we will extend the analytical model to incorporate α-way Regular
Structural Redundancy. An overview of structural redundancy has been provided in
Chapter 1. For tractability of the model, we assume that horizontal nanowires have no
logical dependencies between them.
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The notation used for the probability of faulty output and minterm for a tile with
α-way Regular Structural Redundancy is

and

.

3.6.1 Occurrence of Faulty ‘1’

In tiles with structural redundancy, copies of are made of transistors on each
nanowire and of the nanowires themselves. In a 2-way redundant tile for instance, every
transistor will have a redundant copy in the same nanowire and every nanowire will be
duplicated and logically merged with the next stage. Thus, in a 2-way redundant tile,
twice as many transistors have to be correctly switched-on in order to produce a correct
‘0’ at the output. Hence Equation 3.5 can be extended for the case of 2-way and α-way
Regular Structural Redundancy as follows,
(3.16)
(3.17)

Note that the probability of a minterm being faulty ‘0’ in a structurally redundant
tile,

, is not the same as the probability of a faulty ‘0’ minterm in a non-

redundant tile. This is because redundant copies of transistors are present on each
horizontal nanowire gated by redundant copies of inputs. Thus, In order for a minterm
faulty ‘0’ to occur in 2-way structurally redundant tile for a specific input pattern, twice
as many 1st stage transistors have to be incorrectly switched-on and twice as many
transistors have to remain correctly switched-on compared to a non-redundant tile. Thus
Equation 3.7 can be extended for a structurally redundant tile as follows,
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(3.18)
Equations 3.8 and 3.9 remain valid for tiles with structural redundancy.
3.6.2 Occurrence of Faulty ‘0’
The probability of a faulty ‘0’ for a structurally redundant tile can be extended
from the non-redundant case in a similar manner as faulty ‘1’. Since there are α times the
number of transistors in a α-way FSR compared to a non-redundant tile, the probability of
a faulty ‘0’ is,
(3.19)

The expression for

is the same as in Equation 3.13 except that the

probability of a minterm being faulty ‘1’ is different in the case of a structurally
redundant tile since there are redundant transistors present in the horizontal nanowires.
(3.20)

Since there are α times the number of transistors in the first stage horizontal
nanowire of a α-way FSR compared to a non-redundant tile, the probability of minterm
faulty ‘1’ can be expressed as,
(3.21)
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Similarly

for α-way FSR is similar to Equation 3.4 with the probability of

faulty minterm being different,
(3.22)

By substituting Equation 3.20 and 3.22 into Equation 3.19, the final expression
for the probability of an output faulty ‘0’ can be written as,
(3.23)

3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have derived detailed analytical fault models for NASIC tiles
with and without Regular Structural Redundancy, taking into consideration the defect
scenarios, input faults, circuit and logic style of the fabric. These models will be used in
the next Chapters to analyze the relative proportions of the probability of faulty ‘1’s and
‘0’s and discuss and introduce both modular redundancy and structural redundancy
techniques for their mitigation.
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CHAPTER 4
BIASED VOTING FOR IMPROVED SIGNAL RELIABILITY

4.1 Introduction
Modular redundancy techniques have been widely researched in the past few
decades and include Triple modular redundancy (TMR) [29]-[32] and N-tuple modular
redundancy [33]. Designs of new voter circuits [34][35] and even NMR systems without
a centralized voter [36] have been proposed.
In modular redundancy techniques, identical replicas of modules are created
whose outputs are then voted upon. For instance, in TMR, the outputs of three identical
copies of a (non-redundant) module are fed into a majority voter. If, for example, at least
two of the three modules produce logic ‘0’s, then the voter outputs a ‘0’. Otherwise, the
voter outputs logic ‘1’. The inherent assumption that is made, when majority voters are
employed, is that a ‘0’ to ‘1’ fault (faulty ‘1’) is as likely as a ‘1’ to ‘0’ fault (faulty ‘0’).
In other words, it is assumed that defects within the computational fabric may cause
faulty ‘0’s and faulty ‘1’s with equal probability. However, with nanoscale computation
fabrics based on novel circuit and logic styles, and different defect scenarios due to
unconventional manufacturing, this assumption may no longer be valid. One type of fault
may be more frequent than another. This provides an opportunity to potentially achieve
higher yields by using biased voters, i.e., by offering greater protection against the most
likely faults and less against the others.
In this chapter, we use the analytical models derived in the previous chapter to
analyze the proportions of the probability of output faulty ‘1’ and output faulty ‘0’ for a
structurally non-redundant NASIC tile with non-faulty inputs. We show that for such a
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tile the probability of output faulty ‘1’s is greater than the probability of output faulty
‘0’s. In other words, faulty ‘1’s are more likely to occur at the output of such a tile
compared to faulty ‘0’s. Thus, we compare biased voters to traditional majority voting in
such cases where the probabilities of faulty ‘0’s and faulty ‘1’s are unequal. We show
that as the imbalance between the two fault probabilities is increased, the biased voting
schemes become more effective. In section 4.3, we compare biased voting schemes to
conventional majority voting schemes for general case without regard to any specific
fabric. In section 4.4, we apply biased voting schemes to NASICs and analyze
improvements in the reliability of outputs. Section 4.5 studies the effects on the results
when the voters themselves are allowed to be defective. Section 4.6 summarizes the
chapter.
4.2 Fault Probability Ratio

In order to study the relative proportions of the two types of faults for which
probabilities were derived in the previous sections, we define a parameter called the Fault
Probability Ratio (FPR). The Fault Probability Ratio is the ratio of the probability of a
faulty ‘1’ to the probability of a faulty ‘0’. Thus,
(4.1)

By substituting Equation 3.5 and Equation 3.15 into the above equation, the FPR
can be calculated. From the equations derived in the previous sections it is evident that
the FPR is a function of the defect probability,
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, the probability of input fault,

,

the number of inputs of the logic function, n and the number of minterms, m. However, in
this chapter the inputs to the tile are assumed to be non-faulty. Thus,

.

Figure 4 shows the FPR of a structurally non-redundant NASIC tile with a fan-in
of

for an increasing number of minterms (m) at three different defect rates. It is

observed that the

rises with increasing number of minterms. This is expected since

an increase in the number of transistors in the 2nd stage NAND gate makes faulty ‘0’s
less likely and faulty ‘1’s more likely. A qualitative explanation for this is that a single
transistor being incorrectly switched-off is sufficient to prevent the output node from
discharging to ‘0’.
Furthermore, for a certain NASIC tile, the FPR is greater for a higher value of the
defect rate,

. For instance, the

is 8.1 for a tile with

and

at a

defect rate of 5% and 18.22 for a defect rate of 15%. This can be better observed from
Figure 5 that shows the FPR for a range of defect rates up to 15%. This trend occurs
because as more transistors in the first NAND stage are stuck-on, the probability of the
minterms carrying faulty ‘0’s rises and thus there is an increased chance of a transistor in
the second NAND stage gate being incorrectly switched-off and causing a faulty ‘1’ at
the output of the tile.
Defect rates of up to 15% are considered because any density advantage over
CMOS is lost beyond this rate. In the plots of Figure 5, the average case (i.e., a
symmetric function) was considered where the logic function implemented should
produce (in the defect-free case) a ‘1’ output for half of the

input patterns and ‘0’ for

the remaining half. Hence, the number of minterms for such a logic function is,
.
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Figure 4. Fault Probability Ratio as a function of number of minterms for n=8 at defect
rates of 5%, 10% and 15%

Figure 5. Fault Probability Ratio as a function of defect rate for a range of fan-in (n) when
m=2n-1

Figure 5 shows that although the FPR rises with the defect rate, the rate of
increase is more marked for circuits with higher fan-in (n). Moreover, for a particular
defect rate, the FPR is greater for circuits with higher fan-in. For instance, at a defect rate
of 12%, a tile with a fan-in of 6 had an FPR of 4.5 whereas a tile with a fan-in of 10 had
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an FPR of 12.7. This can be attributed largely to the increase in the number of minterms
and thus increased chances of any one of them carrying a faulty ‘0’ and switching a 2nd
stage NAND gate transistor incorrectly off.
4.3 Biased Voting in General Case
In this section, we compare biased voting schemes to conventional majority
voting schemes for general case without regard to any specific fabric. Figure 6 shows a
TMR and a biased voting configuration. The key difference between the two is the voting
decision: in the first case (TMR) a majority voter is used to vote on three structurally
non-redundant input modules whereas in the second, a voter biased towards a single logic
‘0’ is used. The notation used for this biased voter is V01/3 (voter biased towards logic
‘0’ that will produce logic ‘0’ even if only 1 out of the 3 inputs is ‘0’). A biased voter has
a lower (higher) tolerance for the less (more) prevalent fault type. For instance, the V01/3
biased voter will not be able to tolerate any faulty ‘0’s but can tolerate up to two faulty
‘1’s.
Our objective is to find out whether the use of a biased voter instead of a
conventional majority voter can enhance the expected yield of the voting configuration.

Figure 6. Voting configurations: (a) TMR majority voting, (b) V01/3 biased voting
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Yield is the probability that the circuit will produce a correct output in the presence of
manufacturing defects. The two voting configurations (shown in Figure 6) use the same
three non-redundant nano-modules. Thus, the difference in the probability of producing a
correct output by the two circuits will be due to the different voting schemes. Such an
accurate comparison between the two voting schemes and their corresponding voter
designs can be achieved by using the Signal Reliability metric [43],[44].
To derive the probabilities of producing correct ‘0’ and ‘1’ outputs by the two
voting configurations we use the notations shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Notations
Symbol

Description

VC

Correct output from the voting scheme if it were to take inputs from
defect-free input modules

VA

Actual output from the voting scheme taking inputs from defective
input modules
Conditional probability of getting a input module output of i given
that the correct module output should have been j (i,j=0,1).
Clearly,
+
=1, for j=0,1.
Conditional probability of getting a voter output of i given that the
correct voter output should have been j (i,j=0,1) based on inputs to the
voter. i may differ from j only due to defects within the voter
circuit
Conditional probability of getting a TMR majority voting scheme
output of i given that the correct output should have been j (i,j=0,1)
based on inputs to the input modules. i may differ from j due to
defects within the voter circuit and/or defects in the input
modules
Conditional probability of getting a V01/3 biased voting scheme
output of i given that the correct output should have been j (i,j=0,1)
based on inputs to the input modules. i may differ from j due to
defects within the voter circuit and/or defects in the input
modules
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SR

Signal Reliability: Probability of a correct output from a voter taking
inputs from defective modules

As a preliminary study, faults in voters are not considered in this section to
simplify the resulting expressions. However, section 4.5 discusses the changes in results
when voters are prone to defects. Thus in this section,

.

Assuming ideal voter circuits, a correct ‘0’ (‘1’) will be produced by a TMR if all
three inputs to the voter (from the modules) are correct ‘0’s (‘1’s) or if any two of the
inputs are correct ‘0’s (‘1’s). The probabilities that a TMR generates correct ‘0’s are,
(4.2)
(4.3)
(4.4)

The probabilities that a TMR generates correct ‘1’s are,
(4.5)
(4.6)
(4.7)

Similarly, probability expressions for the V01/3 biased voter can be derived,
(4.8)
(4.9)
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(4.10)
(4.11)

The values of

and

are dependent on the defect rate, defect model and

the circuit and logic styles of the nano-fabric considered.
The signal reliability of the voting scheme’s output can be expressed as:
(4.12)
(4.13)

The signal reliability expressions for the TMR and V01/3 can be obtained by
substituting Equations 4.4 & 4.7 and 4.10 & 4.11 into Equation 4.12 and 4.13
respectively. Using a similar approach, the signal reliability for other majority and biased
voting configurations can be found. It is evident from Equations 4.12 and 4.13 that the
signal reliability not only depends on the probability of faulty ‘1’s and ‘0’s produced by
the input modules but also on the number of input patterns that should correctly generate
‘0’s

and those that should correctly generate ‘1’s

. Figure 7 shows

the signal reliabilities for four different voting schemes over a range of Fault Probability
Ratios (FPR), where the FPR is the ratio between the probability of a faulty ‘1’ to the
probability of a faulty ‘0’ as defined in Equation 4.1. The

biased voting scheme is

biased towards 2 ‘0’s out of the 5 inputs and the 5MR is a majority voting scheme voting
on 5 redundant inputs. Figure 7 (a) and (b) show the signal reliability for
0.05 and 0.1, for a symmetric function where
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values of
. However,

it is also possible for a logic function to be skewed towards ‘1’ or ‘0’ in terms of correct
outputs. Figure 7 (c) and (d) show the signal reliabilities for the cases where
and

, respectively.

As can be seen from Figure 7 (a) and (b), the biased voting schemes (

and

) have a higher signal reliability compared to their corresponding majority voting
schemes (

and

, respectively) with increasing

. As the probability of a

faulty ‘1’ rises compared to that of a faulty ‘0’, the voters biased to logic ‘0’ will be more
likely to produce a correct output. For example, in Figure 7 (b) where
, the

scheme has 20% higher signal reliability than

the 5MR majority scheme while the
reliability than the TMR at
The

biased scheme has a 16% higher signal

.

scheme exhibits higher signal reliability than

whereas for the

= 0.1 with

scheme the benefits over

are achieved only for

for

,
. This

is due to the comparatively poor resilience of the latter scheme to faulty ‘0’s, since a
single faulty ‘0’ causes diminished reliability in that scheme. In this case, the probability
of generating correct ‘1’s at the output of the voter is the dominating factor. On the other
hand, for

, the faulty ‘1’ probability is much higher and the requirement for 2-

out-of-5 ‘0’s for the

voter is harder to achieve. However in the case of the

voter, a single correct ‘0’ is sufficient to ensure a correct final output implying that the
overall reliability is higher. The probability of generating correct ‘0’s is the dominating
factor in this scenario.
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Figure 7. Signal reliability as a function of Fault Probability Ratio (FPR) for (a)
= 0.05,
C
C
C
P(V =0) = 0.5 and (b)
=0.1, P(V =0) = 0.5 (c)
= 0.1, P(V =0) = 0.75 and (d)
=
0.1, P(VC=0) = 0.25

In situations where

such as the case shown in Figure 7,

the frequency of occurrence of faulty ‘1’s (0’s) is further increased (reduced). At an FPR
of 7, a 57% increase in reliability is attained by the
66% increase in reliability is demonstrated by the
(d) shows the opposite case where

scheme over the
scheme over the

while a
. Figure 7

. Here the frequency of

occurrence of faulty ‘1’s is reduced while that of faulty ‘0’s is increased. The
scheme is still able to show a higher reliability from an
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value of 4 up to 8. On the

other hand, the

scheme shows low reliability because of its inability to tolerate even

a single faulty ‘0’. This suggests that a higher reliability maybe attained by switching the
bias of the voters from logic ‘0’ to ‘1’. However, in nanoscale fabrics that implement two
level logic styles, for functions where

, the complementary

rather than the true output is likely to be implemented for reduced area. This again takes
us back to the reverse case depicted in Figure 7 where the biased voters demonstrate
significantly higher signal reliabilities.
To summarize, our analysis of biased and majority voting schemes has shown that
as the ratio of faulty ‘1’s to faulty ‘0’s increases, biased voting configurations exhibit up
to 66% higher signal reliability.
4.4 Biased Voting in NASICs
Section 4.2 showed that the rate of occurrence of faulty ‘1’s is expected to be
higher than that of faulty ‘0’s in NASICs and section 4.3 demonstrated the improvement
in signal reliability that can be gained by applying biased voters to fabrics that have
unequal fault rates. It follows that applying biased voting schemes to NASICs will
provide improved fault tolerance compared to conventional majority voters. In this
section, we apply biased voting schemes to NASICs and compare them to conventional
majority voting schemes.
In this section, the probability expressions for faulty ‘1’s and faulty ‘0’s derived
in Chapter 3, are used to compare the signal reliabilities for circuits implemented with
biased and majority voting schemes. Figure 8 shows the reliabilities for n-input NASIC
circuits for the voting schemes introduced in the previous section.
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As we have previously observed for a given defect rate, there is a minimum fan-in
(n) before biased voting schemes show a higher reliability over majority voting schemes.
Moreover, this required minimum value of fan-in decreases with increasing defect rates.
For example, at a defect rate of 5%, the
reliability than the

biased voting scheme has a greater

scheme only for NASIC circuits with

at a defect rate of 15%, the

or greater. However,

scheme has a higher reliability even for circuits that have

a fan-in of 6. This suggests that at the high defect rates that nanoscale fabrics are subject
to, using biased voting schemes will provide a greater reliability even for circuits with
low fan-in.
For a particular defect rate, the biased voting schemes give a higher reliability as
the circuit fan-in increases due to the increasing

discussed in the previous section.

For instance at 15% defect rate for tiles with fan-in of 10, the
27% greater reliability compared to the TMR scheme while the
24% higher reliability than the

biased scheme has a
biased scheme has

scheme. At a defect rate of 10%, the

20% greater signal reliability and the

exhibits

exhibits 17% greater signal reliability for

circuits with fan-in of 10. The reliability advantage will be even greater when
as shown in section 4.3. This implies that biased voters could be
employed at key architectural points in the design, specifically at the outputs of high fanin stages, for greater yield, while carefully managing yield-area tradeoffs.
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Figure 8. Signal Reliability comparison for biased and majority voting schemes at defect
rates of: (a) 5%, (b) 10%, and (c) 15%

The biased voting schemes may also be more area efficient than majority voters
or, at the worst case, consume the same area when implemented with 2-level logic such
as used in the NASIC fabric. This is because the number of minterms for a biased voter
will be less than or equal to the number of minterms for a majority voter with the same
number of inputs. This implies that the effective yield (i.e., yield divided by the area
increase factor) for biased voting schemes may be higher.
32

4.5 Voter Reliability
In the analysis done in the previous sections of this chapter, voters were assumed
to be perfect. However, since the voters have to be implemented in the same nanoscale
fabric, such as the

biased voter shown in Figure 9 implemented in the NASICs

fabric, they are also susceptible to manufacturing defects. Thus in a realistic scenario
voter faults have to be taken into account. In this section, we analyze and compare signal
reliabilities in voting schemes with voter defects. Notations that have been used in this
section are described in Table 2.
A correct ‘0’ (‘1’) will be produced by a

majority voting scheme if a

majority of the input modules produce correct ‘0’s (‘1’s) and the voter circuit itself
produces a correct ‘0’ (‘1’) or if a majority of the input modules produce incorrect ‘1’s

Figure 9. V02/4 biased voter in NASICs.
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(‘0’s) and the voter circuit produces an incorrect ‘0’ (‘1’). The probabilities that this
majority voting scheme generates correct ‘0’s and ‘1’s are,

Similarly, probability expressions for the

The signal reliability of the

biased voter can be derived,

majority voting scheme and the

voting scheme can be expressed as follows where

The signal reliability expressions for the

biased

:

and

can be obtained by

substituting Equations 4.14 & 4.15 and 4.16 & 4.17 into Equations 4.18 and 4.19
respectively. The values for

can be calculated based on the equations derived

in Chapter 3.5 for NASICs.
The values for

for the TMR and the

biased voted can also be calculated

in a similar manner and is determined by the fan-in and number of minterms in the voter
circuit. For instance, a structurally non-redundant TMR voter would have a fan-in of 3
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and 3 minterms and a

would have the same fan-in but only one minterm since it will

produce a ‘1’ only when all three inputs to it are ‘1’s.
Figure 10 shows the signal reliabilities for the same voting schemes that were
considered in Figure 8 but with consideration of voter defects. As expected, the signal
reliabilities overall decrease since the voters are now defective. It is interesting to note,

Figure 10. Signal Reliability comparison for biased and majority voting schemes after
considering voter defects at defect rates of: (a) 5%, (b) 10%, and (c) 15%
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however, that the biased schemes show an advantage over majority schemes much earlier
on now. For instance at defect rate of 10% in Figure 10 (a)
greater signal reliability for circuits of any fan-in and the

biased scheme now has
voter overtakes the

for circuits with fan-in greater than 4 as opposed to 6. This is because the biased voter
circuits require fewer minterms than majority voter circuits and hence the number of
transistors in the biased voter circuits is fewer. Thus they have a lower probability of
being defective compared to majority voters which have larger circuits. On the same
note, biased voters are expected to take lesser area than majority voters and thus provide
greater signal reliability per unit area.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter we have shown that for structurally non-redundant NASIC tiles
with non-faulty inputs, the probability of output faulty ‘1’s can be as much as 12 times
greater than the probability of output faulty ‘0’s for a tile with a fan-in of 10. It was
shown that this ratio can be even greater for circuits with a higher fan-in and at greater
defect rates. We have shown that the application of biased voting schemes as compared
to conventional majority voting schemes provided improved signal reliability in NASICs
due to the inequality in fault rates. The biased voting schemes were shown to have as
much as 27% greater signal reliability compared to conventional majority voting
schemes. This advantage over majority voting schemes was shown to be retained when
voter defects were considered.
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CHAPTER 5
STRUCTURAL REDUNDANCY IN CASCADED NASICS

5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters we utilized analytical models to analyze fault
characteristics in non-cascaded and structurally non-redundant NASIC tiles with ideal
inputs. To build larger systems, however, NASIC tiles will have to be cascaded. Hence,
evaluation of the fault characteristics and improvement of the signal reliability through
cascaded NASIC tiles is necessary. Furthermore, modular redundancy alone will not be
sufficient to tolerate the high defect rates characteristic of nanoscale fabrics since
multiple input modules may be faulty. Thus, structural redundancy needs to be
incorporated in the tiles. In this chapter, we will study the propagation of faulty ‘1’s and
faulty ‘0’s through cascades of structurally redundant NASIC tiles and their effect on the
overall Signal Reliability. In our analysis, we demonstrate that the Signal Reliability
through cascades of tiles with Regular Structural Redundancy rapidly drops after a few
cascades due to an escalation of the probability of output faulty ‘0’s. Having identified
that tiles with Regular Structural Redundancy are intolerant of input faulty ‘0’s, we
propose and introduce a novel structural redundancy scheme called the Staggered
Structural Redundancy (SSR) that offers improved resilience against input faulty ‘0’s.
We show that cascades of tiles with Staggered Structural Redundancy maintain high
signal reliability for larger levels of cascades than were possible using Regular Structural
Redundancy.
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Figure 11: Regular Structural Redundancy schemes for a NASIC tile implementing a 2input XOR logic function: (a) NASIC tile with no structural redundancy incorporated (b)
NASIC tile with 2-way RSR

5.2 Regular Structural Redundancy

Figure 11 shows a 2-input XOR NASIC tile without structural redundancy and its
implementation with 2-way and 3-way Regular Structural Redundancy. In the 2-way
RSR shown in Figure 11 (b), each nanowire has two Redundant Units and there are four
such Redundant Units in total in the first stage of the tile.
5.2.1 Fault Propagation along cascade
In this section we analyze the propagation of faulty ‘1’ and faulty ‘0’ through a
cascade of NASIC tiles with Regular Structural Redundancy. Depending on the specific
NASIC system, tiles may be cascaded differently. For instance, output signals from a tile
may be input to multiple tiles at different levels of the cascade. We analyze the
propagation of faults through one example of the cascade structure shown in Figure 12
(another example of Ripple Carry Adder is shown in Section 5.4). In this cascade
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Figure 12: Cascade structure used to analyze propagation of faults

structure, there are n levels of cascade. Each tile in the cascade is assumed to have the
same number of inputs and minterms. All the inputs of a tile in the cascade are assumed
to have the same probability of being faulty and this is equal to the probability of output
faults from the preceding tile in the cascade.
In order to analyze the propagation of faults through the cascade shown in Figure
12, we have used the analytical model derived in Chapter 3. The model determined the
probability of output faulty ‘1’ and ‘0’ in terms of the probability of defects within the
tile and the probability of input faults from the preceding tile. This model is used to
calculate the probability of output faults after each level of the cascade using the values
from the preceding tile as its probability of input faults. Inputs to the tile in Level 1 of the
cascade are assumed to be fault-free.
Figure 13(a) shows the probability of output faults and the Signal Reliability (SR)
at the output of each cascade level along a cascade of NASIC tiles with no structural
redundancy (1w-RSR) and with tile specifications of n=4 and m=8 at a defect rate of
10%. The Signal Reliability (SR) is the probability of a correct output as was defined in
Chapter 4. In our analysis we assume that output ‘0’ and ‘1’ are equally likely at the
output of an ideal NASIC tile. Hence, the Signal Reliability is
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Figure 13: Probability of output faulty ‘0’ and faulty ‘1’ and Signal Reliability of cascaded
tiles with n=4 and m=8 at 10% stuck-on probability for (a) tiles with no structural
redundancy (b) with 1w-RSR and (c) with 2w-RSR

where

and

is the probability of output faulty ‘1’ and faulty ‘0’ respectively.

Figure 13(a) shows that the probability of output faulty ‘1’ is 0.24 after the first cascade
level and the probability of output faulty ‘0’ is 0.08. The Fault Probability Ratio is thus
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greater than 1 and this is consistent with our analysis in Chapter 4.1. It can be seen from
Figure 13(a) that the probability of faulty ‘1’ increases along the cascade suppressing the
probability of faulty ‘0’. This is because as the rate of input faulty ‘1’s increases,
transistors in the first NAND stage of a NASIC tile (such as the shown in Figure 11(a))
are incorrectly switched-on. This increases the rate of minterm faulty ‘0’s causing
transistors in the 2nd NAND stage to be incorrectly switched-off thus causing output
faulty ‘1’s. For the same reason, the rate of output faulty ‘0’s are reduced. This can also
be explained using the analytical models derived in Chapter 3. As
Equation 3.8,
With that
and

increases and this causes

increases in

to also increase in Equation 3.7.

reduces in Equation 3.4 finally causing

in Equation 3.5 to increase

to decrease in Equation 3.12.
It can be seen from Figure 13(a) that after 3 levels of cascade, the probability of

faulty ‘1’ reaches 1 and the probability of faulty ‘0’ reaches 0. This means that the output
of the third cascade level will be stuck at logic ‘1’. The Signal Reliability is 0.5 because
about half the time logic ‘1’ is the correct value. Thus, clearly NASIC tiles cannot be
cascaded without structural or modular redundancy since the faults will accumulate along
the cascade.
Figure 13(b) shows the results for a cascade of the same tile specifications but
implemented with 2-way Regular Structural Redundancy (2w-RSR). It can be seen that
the Signal Reliability in this case drops to 0.5 much later in the cascade, i.e. after 6 levels,
compared to the previous case. This is because every transistor has a redundant copy thus
providing tolerance against stuck-on defects. However, it is interesting to observe that the
reason for the drop in Signal Reliability in this cascade, is the escalation of probability of
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output faulty ‘0’s instead of faulty ‘1’s, unlike the previous case. Although the
probability of output faulty ‘0’ starts off with a lower value compared to the probability
of output faulty ‘1’ after level 1 of the cascade, it quickly dominates and saturates to 1
after 6 levels of cascade. This leads us to conclude that tiles with Regular Structural
Redundancy have reduced resilience against input faulty ‘0’s and improved resilience
against input faulty ‘1’s compared to structurally non-redundant tiles. Hence, if the
resilience against input faulty ‘0’s from preceding tiles could be improved alongside
tolerating stuck-on defects within the structurally redundant tile, then Signal Reliability
can be further improved, enabling larger cascades.
We have identified two factors that cause diminished resilience against input
faulty ‘0’ in tiles with Regular Structural Redundancy. Firstly, for tiles with RSR the
probability of the minterm being faulty ‘1’ is greater. This is due to the fact that a single
incorrectly switched-off transistor in a horizontal nanowire (induced by an input faulty

Figure 14: 3w-RSR tile demonstrating diminished resilience to input faulty '0'
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‘0’) is sufficient to cause the minterm to be faulty ‘1’ and furthermore, the number of
transistors in the horizontal nanowire is multiplied due to redundancy. For instance, a 3wRSR tile has three times the number of transistors in each horizontal nanowire compared
to a non-redundant tile. Secondly, logical dependencies exist between redundant copies
of horizontal nanowires because they are gated by the same input signals. Thus, a faulty
‘0’ input may cause all redundant copies of a horizontal nanowire to produce faulty
minterm ‘1’s leading to faulty output ‘0’ at the vertical nanowire. Figure 14 shows the
3w-RSR tile from Figure 11(c) this time with inputs. The correct inputs to the tile (shown
in green) are

and

which in an ideal scenario would produce an output

However if any of the input ‘1’s become a faulty ‘0’, such as

.

shown in the figure, then

the relevant transistors in all three horizontal nanowires are incorrectly switched-off. In
the example shown in Figure 14, this causes all the three transistors shown in yellow in
the vertical nanowire to be incorrectly switched-on resulting in a faulty ‘0’ at the output.
In section 5.3 we propose a novel structural redundancy scheme that circumvents this
problem to improve resilience against input faulty ‘0’s while tolerating stuck-on defects.
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5.2.2 Resilience to Input Faults

In this section, we study the resilience of the 3w-RSR scheme against input faulty
‘0’s. Figure 15(a) shows a 4-input NASIC tile with ideal input ‘1’s and faulty ‘0’s with a
probability of

. Figure 15(b) shows the probability of output faulty ‘1’s and ‘0’s as

the probability of input faulty ‘0’ varies from 0 to 0.5. The results were obtained using
the analytical fault models from Chapter 3. When

, the probability of output

faults for 1w-RSR is the greatest because it does not have any redundancy against the
stuck-on defects. The probability of output faulty ‘1’s is greater than faulty ‘0’s due to the
reasons stated in Chapter 4. As the probability of input faulty ‘0’s increases, probability
of output faulty ‘0’s for the 3w-RSR becomes greater than the 2w-RSR and the 1w-RSR.

Figure 15: Resilience to input faulty '0' by non-redundant tile, 2w-RSR and 3w-RSR for n=4, m=8. (a)
4-input tile with 10% defect rate and with faulty input ‘0’s. (b) Probability of output faults as a
function of probability of input faulty '0's
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This is because the 3w-RSR has three times the number of input signals due to
redundancy compared to the non-redundant signal coupled with the fact that a single
input faulty ‘0’ may cause an output faulty ‘0’ as explained in the preceding section.
5.3 Staggered Structural Redundancy
5.3.1 Introduction
Having identified the rapid escalation of faulty ‘0’s along the cascade of tiles with
Regular Structural Redundancy, the goal in designing the new Staggered Structural
Redundancy is to increase tolerance against input faulty ‘0’s. This will delay or even
avoid the ‘avalanche’ of faulty ‘0’s making larger cascades feasible. In Staggered
Structural Redundancy (SSR), we propose to selectively remove certain redundant units
from the corresponding Regular Structural Redundancy such that each Redundant Input
Group (RIG) does not gate transistors on all 3 redundant copies of each horizontal
nanowire. Figure 16 shows one example of the Staggered Structural Redundancy, the
(3,2)-SSR. It is so named because it has 3 RIGs and each horizontal nanowire is 2-way
redundant. The (3,2)-SSR is more resilient against input faulty ‘0’ compared to the 3wRSR in Figure 14. For instance, if the same input,

, is faulty ‘0’, transistor

in the

vertically nanowire is not affected and is correctly switched-off to produce the correct
output of ‘1’. Thus, assuming no defects, the (3,2)-SSR tile is guaranteed to tolerate at
least a single input faulty ‘0’ whereas the 3w-RSR in Figure 14 was unable to tolerate
even a single input faulty ‘0’. On the other hand, the (3,2)-SSR has reduced tolerance to
stuck-on defects compared to compared to the 3w-RSR since each horizontal nanowire is
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now 2way redundant instead of 3way. Thus, at very high defect rates the (3,2)-SSR will
show reduced advantage over the 3w-RSR and this is discussed in Section 5.3.5.
5.3.2 Criteria and Notation
In order to define criteria for the Staggered Structural Redundancy schemes, we
first define matrix notations for the schemes that relates to the presence or absence of
Redundant Units in the first NAND stage of the tile. In the m × m square matrix, 1
indicates the presence of Redundant Units of transistors and 0 indicates absence. Thus,
the matrix notation for the 3w-RSR shown in Figure 14 will be 3×3 square matrix with
all elements as 1.
The criteria that needs to be fulfilled by the Staggered Structural Redundancy
scheme to achieve improved resilience to input faulty ‘0’s without considerable loss of
tolerance of stuck-on defects are as follows:
 At least a single 0 and at least a single 1 in each column of the matrix notation for

Figure 16. (3,2) staggered structural redundancy of 2-input XOR gate in NASICs
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the staggered structural redundancy.
 An equal number of 1s and an equal number of 0s in each column of the matrix
notation.
The above two criteria ensure that at least a single input faulty ‘0’ is tolerated by a
tile assuming the tile itself is defect-free. Furthermore, it ensures that all horizontal
nanowires are equally redundant. The presence of a lesser redundant nanowire in the tile
could make the whole tile susceptible to stuck-on defects or input faulty ‘1’s. Note that
for each SSR scheme there may be more than one possible matrix notation. However, in
terms of logic implementation and input fault tolerance, the different matrix notations
will have the same effect. Table 3 shows the matrix notations of 3w-RSR and two
possible SSR schemes with the same number of Redundant Input Groups, the (3,2)-SSR
and the (3,1)-SSR.
Table 3: Matrix notation of structural redundancy schemes

Structural Redundancy
Possible Matrix Notation
Type
3w-RSR:

(3,2)-SSR:

(3,1)-SSR

The (3,1)-SSR scheme has three Redundant Input Groups and each horizontal
nanowire in the tile is 1way redundant. In other words, there are no redundant transistors
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presents. Thus, although the tile would be more tolerant of input faulty ‘0’s, it is more
susceptible to stuck-on defects and input faulty ‘1’s compared to the (3,2)-SSR.
5.3.3 Simulation Framework

The analytical models derived in Chapter 3 did not take into account logical
dependencies between horizontal nanowires in order to keep the models tractable. Thus
to achieve more accurate comparisons of the fault tolerance of the Staggered Structural
Redundancy and the Regular Structural Redundancy schemes, Monte Carlo simulations
have been used. The simulator first creates a faulty tile by mapping stuck-on defects on
the ideal tile based on the probability of stuck-on defects. It then generates an input
pattern from a set of all possible input patterns with uniform distribution. Faulty input
patterns are created by flipping the bits based on the probability of input faulty ‘1’ and
faulty ‘0’. The ideal inputs are fed into the defect-free tile and faulty inputs are fed into
the faulty tile and the outputs are compared. Based on the comparison results of 100,000
such iterations the probability of output faults and the Signal Reliability are computed.
5.3.4 Resilience to Input Faults
Figure 17 compares the resilience to input faulty ‘0’ offered by the 3way Regular
Structural Redundancy and the (3,2) Staggered Structural Redundancy schemes. Figure
17(a) shows the NASIC tile simulated for this purpose which is a 4-input tile
implementing the XOR function. Simulations were carried out for the 3w-RSR and the
(3,2)-RSR schemes with a 10% defect rate, probability of input faulty ‘1’ as 0 and
varying the probability of input faulty ‘0’ from 0 to 0.4. Figure 17(b) shows the
probability of output faulty ‘1’ and the probability of output faulty ‘0’ for the two
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schemes. The probability of output faulty ‘0’ increases and the probability of output
faulty ‘1’ decreases or stays at 0 for both schemes with increasing probability of input
faulty ‘0’. This is because input faulty ‘0’s cause minterms to be faulty ‘1’s which in turn
causes output faulty ‘0’s. Also, the presence of input faulty ‘0’s may mask the effect of
stuck-on transistors in the horizontal nanowires and avoid minterm faulty ‘0’s, thus
reducing the probability of output faulty ‘1’s. This can be explained using the analytical

Figure 17: Resilience to input faulty '0' by 3w-RSR and (3,2)-SSR for n=4, m=8. (a) 4-input
XOR tile with 10% defect rate and with faulty input ‘0’s. (b) Probability of output faults for
the two schemes (c) Signal Reliability for the two schemes
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models just as was done for input faulty ‘1’s in Section 5.3.1.
From Figure 17(b) it can be seen that the probability of output faulty ‘0’ in the
(3,2)-SSR is lower than that of the 3w-RSR. For instance, at a probability of input faulty
‘0’ of 0.1, the probability of output faulty ‘0’ for the 3w-RSR is 0.62 and that for the
(3,2)-SSR is 0.27 representing a 56% improvement over the 3w-RSR. This is because in
the (3,2)-SSR scheme, a single faulty ‘0’ does not affect all the redundant horizontal
nanowires due to the absence of Redundant Units as shown in Figure 16. As a result, at
least one transistor in the corresponding vertical nanowire will be correctly switched-off
(if it is not defective) and prevent an output faulty ‘0’. On the other hand, in the 3w-RSR,
a single faulty ‘0’ may affect cause all transistors in the corresponding vertical nanowire
to switch-on, leading to an output faulty ‘0’. It can also be seen that the probability of
output faulty ‘1’ of the (3,2)-SSR is slightly higher compared to the 3w-RSR at low
probability of input faulty ‘0’s. This is because in the (3,2)-SSR each horizontal nanowire
is 2way redundant whereas in the 3w-RSR they are 3way redundant. Hence (3,2)-SSR
has reduced tolerance to stuck-on defects and to input faulty ‘1’s which may cause the
minterm to be faulty ‘0’ leading to output faulty ‘1’s. However, having identified the
rapid escalation of faulty ‘0’s along a cascade of 3w-RSR, the benefits of increased
tolerance to input faulty ‘0’ by the (3,2)-SSR is expected to outweigh the reduced
tolerance to stuck-on defects and input faulty ‘1’s at low enough defect rates along the
cascade.
Figure 17(c) shows the overall Signal Reliability of the output of the two
redundancy schemes. It can be seen that the Signal Reliability of the (3,2)-SSR is greater
than that of the 3w-RSR at a particular probability of input faulty ‘0’. For instance, at a
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probability of input faulty ‘0’ of 0.1, the Signal Reliability of the (3,2)-SSR is 0.86
whereas that of the 3w-RSR is 0.69 representing a 24% increase in Signal Reliability
compared to the 3w-RSR. This increase in Signal Reliability is dominated by the reduced
probability of output faulty ‘0’ of the (3,2)-SSR.
5.3.5 Fault Propagation along cascade
Figure 18 shows the fault probabilities and Signal Reliability at each level of the
cascade shown in Figure 12 for 2w-RSR, 3w-RSR and (3,2)-SSR. Each NASIC tile is
simulated using the simulation framework described in Section 5.3.3 with the output fault
probabilities of one tile being the input fault probabilities for the tile in the next cascade
level.
Figure 18(a) shows the probability of output faulty ‘1’ and ‘0’ for the three
schemes at 10% defect rate. It can be seen that the probability of output faulty ‘0’ for the
2w-RSR and 3w-RSR rises rapidly after the 2nd and 3rd cascade level, respectively,
whereas the escalation of output faulty ‘0’s in the (3,2)-SSR is delayed until the 17th
level thus marking a significant improvement. On the other hand, the probability of
output faulty ‘1’ is slightly higher for the (3,2)-SSR due to its reduced tolerance to input
faulty ‘1’s and susceptibility to stuck-on defects compared to corresponding RSR
schemes. Figure 18(b) shows the overall Signal Reliability for the three schemes. The
trends are seen to be strongly dominated by the probability of output faulty ‘0’s as
expected. The Signal Reliability for the 3w-RSR is better compared to the (3,2)-SSR
before the 3rd cascade level, because during those initial cascades, the Signal Reliability
is dominated by the output faulty ‘1’s since the probability of output ‘0’s is still low.
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Figure 18:(a)Probability of output faults and (b) Signal Reliability along cascade of tiles
with n=4 and m=8 at 10% defect rate

Figure 19(a) and (b) shows the Signal Reliabilities for the three schemes at 5%
and 10% defect rates, respectively.
It can be seen from Figure 19(a) that the Signal Reliability of the (3,2)-SSR is
nearly 1 for at least 15 cascades whereas the Signal Reliability of the 2w-RSR and the
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Figure 19: Signal Reliability along cascade of 2w-RSR, 3w-RSR and (3,2)-SSR for tiles with
n=4, m=8 and at (a) 5% defect rate and (b) 15% defect rate

3w-RSR drop to 0.5 after 6 and 7 cascade levels, respectively. In fact, the Signal
Reliability of the (3,2)-SSR have been found to be over 0.98 for more than 100 cascade
levels. This is because the output faulty ‘1’s and ‘0’s that are produced by a (3,2)-SSR
tile at 5% defect rate, is effectively tolerated by the next tile in the cascade avoiding
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magnification of fault probabilities. As a result an ‘avalanche’ of faults is avoided
keeping the Signal Reliability above 0.98 for a significantly large number of cascade
levels.
Table 4 lists the cascade levels at which the Signal Reliability drops to 0.5 for the
2w-RSR, 3w-RSR and (3,2)-SSR schemes at different defect rates up to 15%. For defect
rates below 8%, the Signal Reliability of the (3,2)-SSR scheme does not drop below 0.98
for at least 100 levels of cascade. The maximum cascade level with Signal Reliability
above 0.5 for the (3,2)-SSR starts decreasing rapidly for increasing defect rates above
8%. This is because more transistors in the 2nd NAND stage of the tile are stuck-on
leading to output faulty ‘0’s thus causing an ‘avalanche’ much earlier on in the cascade. It
is interesting to note that at 15% defect rate, the gradual fall of the Signal Reliability of
the (3,2)-SSR shown in Figure 19(b) is due to a gradual rise in output faulty ‘1’s. This
occurs because each horizontal nanowire in the (3,2)-SSR is 2way redundant thus
producing more output faulty ‘1’s. The increased number of output faulty ‘1’s mask
output faulty ‘0’s and eventually dominate.
Table 4: Cascade level after which Signal Reliability is 0.5

2w-RSR
3w-RSR
(3,2)-SSR

3%
6
7
>100

5%
6
7
>100

Defect Rates
8%
5
6
75

10%
4
5
20

15%
4
5
12

5.4 Example: Ripple Carry Adder

In this section, we compare the degradation of the Signal Reliability of the carry
signal through a 16-bit ripple carry adder implemented with 3w-RSR and (3,2)-SSR.

54

Figure 20: (a) 16-bit Ripple carry adder with ideal inputs and faulty carry signal. (b) Signal
Reliability of carry signal at each cascade level for 3w-RSR and (3,2)-SSR at 10% defect
rate (b) Signal Reliability of the (3,2)-SSR at 5%, 10% , 15% and 20% defect rates

Figure 20(a) shows the 16-bit ripple carry adder with ideal inputs and

to the first tile

in the cascade. The reliability of the carry signal degrades through the cascade. Figure
20(b) shows the signal reliability of the carry signal at the output of each cascade level
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for the implementations, 3w-RSR and (3,2)-SSR, at 10% defect rate. The signal
reliability of the carry signal in the 3w-RSR implementation drops to 0.5 after 11
cascades levels. However, the signal reliability of the carry out signal at the end of the 16
cascade levels in the (3,2)-SSR implementation is 0.97, marking a significant
improvement over the 3w-RSR scheme. Figure 20(c) shows the signal reliability of the
carry signal in the (3,2)-SSR implementation at 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% defect rates. The
signal reliability of the carry signal after 16 levels of cascade are 0.99, 0.97, 0.94 and
0.64 respectively. The signal reliability is lower with higher defect rates because the
probability of faulty ‘1’s increases with increasing probability of stuck-on transistors as
was shown in Chapter 3.
5.5 Example: Cascade of 2-bit Comparators

In this section, we compare the Signal Reliabilities of signals in RSR and SSR
implementations through a cascade of 2-bit comparators whose output is the maximum of
two 2-bit numbers. Such a cascade of 16 levels is shown in Figure 21(a). Figure 21(b)
shows the Signal Reliability of each of the two bits propagating along the cascade for 3wRSR and (3,2)-SSR implementations at 5% defect rate. It can be seen that the Signal
Reliabilities in the 3w-RSR implementation drops to their minimum value after 7 levels
of cascade. After 7 levels of cascade, the output signals are all ‘0’s. The minimum values
are different for the two bits because the number of minterms is different and thus the
probability that ‘0’ is the correct output signal is different for the two bits. The Signal
Reliabilities of the (3,2)-SSR scheme remain above 0.98 after 16 levels of cascade.
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Figure 21: (a) Cascade of 2-bit comparators. (b) Signal Reliability along cascade of 3w-RSR
and (3,2)-SSR implementations at 5%, (b) 10% and (c) 15% defect rate

Figure 21(b) shows the Signal Reliabilities at 10% defect rate. It can be seen
that the degradation in Signal Reliability for the (3,2)-SSR scheme is greater in this case.
Figure 21(c) shows the comparisons at 15% defect rate. It can be seen that the Signal
Reliabilities of the (3,2)-SSR schemes reaches their minimum values after 10 levels of
cascade. This occurs due to an escalation and eventual saturation of faulty ‘1’s. The
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minimum value is different from the 3w-RSR case because in the 3w-RSR a saturation of
faulty ‘0’s occur.
5.6 Sensitivity to Stuck-Off Defects
In our analysis so far, we considered only stuck-on defects. In this section we
provide a sensitivity analysis of the Signal Reliability through cascade implementations
with stuck-off defects. Figure 22 shows the Signal Reliability along the cascade shown in
Figure 12 with 10% total defect rate among which PS-OFF is the stuck-off rate and PSON is the stuck-on rate.

–

. Figure 22(a) shows the Signal Reliability

in 3w-RSR implementation of the cascade. It can be seen that significant drop in Signal
Reliability occurs with even 1% rate of stuck-off defects. This is because a single stuckoff defect is sufficient to cause output of nanowire to be stuck at ‘1’.
Figure 22(b) shows the Signal Reliability in a (3,2)-SSR implementation. It can be
seen that the SSR scheme is also equally affected by stuck-off defects. This is because,
regardless of faults in the input signals, local stuck-off defects will have the same impact
on both schemes since a single stuck-off transistors is sufficient to cause permanent fault
at output a nanowire.
5.7 Summary
An analysis of fault propagation along a cascade of tiles with Regular Structural
Redundancy was conducted using detailed analytical fault models. It was found that a
rapid escalation of the probability of output faulty ‘0’s occurred along such a cascade and
this was the dominant factor in the sharp drop in Signal Reliability after a few cascade
levels. A new redundancy scheme called the Staggered Structural Redundancy was
proposed whose design was motivated by the need to improve tolerance against input
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faulty ‘0’s in order make larger cascades feasible. Simulation results showed that a single
tile with (3,2) Staggered Structural Redundancy offered up to 56% more resilience
against input faulty ‘0’s compared to the 3way Regular Structural Redundancy at 10%
defect rate. The (3,2)-SSR scheme showed significant improvements in the Signal
Reliability along a cascade of tiles compared to the 2w-RSR and the 3w-RSR. For
instance, at a defect rate of 5%, the (3,2)-SSR Signal Reliability was greater than 0.98
after at least 100 levels of cascade whereas the that of the 3w-RSR dropped to 0.5 after 7
levels of cascade.
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Figure 22: Signal Reliability along cascade with 10% total defect rate and PS-OFF stuck-off
rate for (a) 3w-RSR and (b) (3,2)-SSR
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we developed detailed analytical fault models of the NASIC fabric
taking into account its defect scenarios and its logic and circuit styles. Using the model,
we have shown that the probability of output faulty ‘1’s and ‘0’s are unequal for single
NASIC tiles. Consequently, application of biased voting schemes was shown to have up
to 27% improvement on the signal reliability compared to conventional majority voting
schemes. In this thesis, we also provided a study of the propagation of faults through a
cascade of structurally redundant NASIC tiles. We have shown that a rapid escalation of
faulty ‘0’s occur along the cascade of tiles with Regular Structural Redundancy
eventually leading to decreased signal reliability. Motivated by this, we designed and
introduced novel Staggered Structural Redundancy schemes that provide up to 56%
improved tolerance to input faulty ‘0’s. We demonstrate that in a cascade of NASIC tiles
employing the Staggered Structural Redundancy, the signal reliability of outputs at each
cascade level remained above 0.98 for over 100 levels of cascade at 5% defect rate.
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